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Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble:
Implementing the Right to Appeal from
Adjudications of Delinquency in
Pennsylvania
By Donald J. Harris*
I. Introduction
One year after the United States Supreme Court delivered its famous
decision, In re Gault,' spelling out the minimum standards of due
process for the adjudicatory phase of state juvenile delinquency
proceedings, the following observation was made:
Few commentators have considered the question of the attorney's role
or duty in relation to the appeal of the juvenile case. One possible
reason for the lack of academic consideration of this stage in the
handling of a juvenile case is that very few juvenile cases have gone
to the appellate level in proportion to the number adjudicated.
Another reason might be the fact that, until recently, most juveniles
were not represented by counsel at any stage of the juvenile
proceeding. While it may not be necessary to have counsel in order
to appeal a case, it would be a rare juvenile defendant who would
even know of his right to appeal, much less one who would know the
means of perfecting an appeal or of preserving error for review. The
advent of the attorney in juvenile courts should increase substantially
the number of appeals taken in juvenile cases.2
*Director of Research, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts; Ph.D. Temple University,
1978. I want to thank William F. Cercone, Joy A. Chapper, David Donaldson, Howard Holmes,
Hunter Hurst, Thomas B. Marvell, H. Ted Rubin, David Rudovsky, Ira M. Schwartz, Robert G.
Schwartz and Charles Thrall for their many valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Points of view expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent the official position
or policies of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts or any component of the unified
judicial system of Pennsylvania.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme Court ruled that when a child faces potential
confinement, delinquency proceedings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment, including notice of the specific charges, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses called by the state, and protection from compulsory self-incrimination.
Subsequent decisions broadened the child's constitutional safeguards to include proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and protection against double jeopardy,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
2. Comment, Appellate Review of Juvenile Court Proceedings and the Role of the Attorney,
13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 90 (1968). The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice reached a similar conclusion: "By and large the juvenile court system has
operated without appellate surveillance . . . Two factors contribute substantially to the lack of
review. The absence of counsel in the great majority of cases is the first ... The other important
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A quarter of a century later, private and public defenders are
commonplace in the juvenile courts of America. In Pennsylvania, the
locus of the present study, administrative records indicate that
representation by counsel, unless expressly waived by the defendant, 3 is
universal in cases that result in a finding of delinquency and the child's
placement out of the hime. Whether representation leads to more
appeals is still an open question; it seems that juvenile appeals have not
been the subject of quantitative research in any U.S. jurisdiction. One
aim of this study is to provide baseline information on juvenile appeal
rates in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides an absolute right of appeal
from juvenile delinquency proceedings.4 Appeals as of right from the
judgment of the juvenile court are taken to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, the intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over
juvenile and adult criminal matters.' In the state judicial hierarchy, the
setting of jurisprudential policy is principally the task of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.6 Although the supreme court may grant a petition for
factor is the general absence of transcripts of juvenile proceedings." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, at 115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967).
3. The waiver rate in 1991 was 1.03 percent. JUVENILE COURT JUDGES' COMMISSION,
PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS 1991, Series J-2 No. 21, at 14.
4. The juvenile's right to appeal is conferred by Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which provides, "There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from
a court not of record; there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an
administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as shall be provided by law."
Because the juvenile courts of Pennsylvania are courts of record, the right of appeal attaches. In
the Interest of A.P., 617 A.2d 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Note that the United States Supreme Court has never held that states must afford citizens the
right of appellate review as an element of due process. However, it has held that if a state grants
such a right, it must provide a meaningful review. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 742 (1981).
6. The supreme court is the highest court of the Commonwealth and in it is reposed the
supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth. PA. CONST. art. V, § 2. For a synopsis of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's policy-setting role, see In Re Stout, 559 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1989). The
complementary roles of the superior and supreme courts closely follow the national pattern:
The intermediate court normally serves two purposes: (1) it decides the mass of appeals
and (2) thereby leaves the top court free to determine questions of law, particularly those
that may develop the law as a whole. The highest court formulates doctrine while the
intermediate court decides cases in accordance with preexisting law. The intermediate
court is in a good position, however, to stimulate revision of the law by calling attention
to the need for change, either legislative or judicial, when it cannot itself make change.
ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF
APPELLATE COURTS (1976), at 64.
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an appeal from a decision of the superior court, in the large majority of
cases such petitions are denied.7 The superior court is thus the final
arbiter of legal disputes in Pennsylvania in nearly all cases within its
jurisdiction, including allegations of delinquency and crime.
The purpose of this study is to encourage and organize a policy
discussion on how best to implement juveniles' state constitutional right
of appellate review in light of widespread concern that appeals may
undermine the rehabilitation of the delinquent child. The focus is on
minors whom the court has adjudged delinquent and removed from the
home. To motivate the discussion, four propositions are advanced. The
first is sociological and asserts the existence of a subculture, a generally
shared set of values among the practitioners of juvenile court, in which
the goals of rehabilitation are paramount and are usually found to
outweigh the child's right to decide whether or not to challenge the
adjudication or commitment. The second proposition is statistical and
asserts that the available data on appeals are consistent with the concept
of a treatment-oriented subculture in the tradition of parens patriae, the
state as parent and decision-maker. The third is legal-theoretical and
asserts that appellate review provides an essential counterweight to the
closed, informal proceedings of juvenile court. The fourth is
methodological and normative and asserts that while evidence that
appeals adversely affect the rehabilitation of juveniles is lacking, every
effort should be made to ensure that treatment plans are not compromised
by the pendency of an appeal. The study is limited to first-level appeals,
that is, appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
II. Superior Court Review
To provide a context for the analysis, a brief sketch of the
institutional functions of the superior court might be helpful. Appeals
are the vehicle by which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania supervises
the trial process, correcting errors by reversing or modifying trial court
decisions.8 Because reversals are a more decisive rejection of a lower
7. Of the 2,128 allocatur (allowance of appeal) petitions filed in 1991 with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, 1,865 or about 88 percent were denied. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, 1991 CASELOAD STATISTICS OF THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
PENNSYLVANIA, at 3.
8. In Pennsylvania, the trial courts, which include the juvenile and criminal courts, are the
courts of common pleas, having original jurisdiction over all cases not exclusively assigned to
another court. PA. CONST. art. V, § 5; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 931 (1981). Each of the sixty
judicial districts in the Commonwealth houses one common pleas court. Judicial district boundaries
generally follow county lines, although seven of the districts encompass two counties. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 901 (1981).
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court's reasoning or conduct than a statement of disapproval in an
affirming opinion upholding the result below, superior court opinions
accompanying reversals usually contain more systematic guidance for
judges "in the trenches." Appellate affirmation of both the trial court's
reasoning and result also serves a constructive purpose. For the litigants,
it validates the propriety of the trial court's decision; for the trial judge
and counsel, it reinforces their understanding of the law. Thus, superior
court review is advantageous for at least four reasons:
1. it corrects errors committed by the common pleas courts;
2. it contributes to uniformity of decision throughout the
jurisdiction; 9
3. it helps to maintain the legitimacy of the judicial process for
litigants and the public; and
4. it educates the trial bench and bar in the latest developments in
the law.
With respect to the error-correction function, it should be mentioned
that judges, in the midst of trial, are required to make immediate rulings,
without the benefit of extended reflection or research, and it is
reasonable to expect some level of reversible error. The data show that
the superior court grants relief, in full or in part, in about 14 percent of
the criminal appeals decided by written opinion."l  While not
9. "The desire for uniformity of juvenile court decisions need not militate against the goal of
individualization of the child and his situation, because individualization is of paramount importance
only in the dispositional phase of the juvenile court hearing. Uniformity is a valid objective in the
jurisdictional and adjudicative (as opposed to dispositional) processes of the court, and it is not likely
to be achieved without appellate review." Addision M. Bowman, Appeals from Juvenile Courts, 11
CRIME & DELINQ. 63, 64 (1965) (footnote omitted).
10. 1990 superior court dispositions were as follows:
Affirmed 1,973
Affirmed in part, remanded in part 6
Affirmed in part, reversed in part 7
Affirmed in part, vacated in part 37
Affirmed/reversed/remanded in part I
Appeal quashed/dismissed 68
Reversed & appellant discharged 4




Vacated in part/remanded in part 10
Vacated and remanded 123
Petition for allowance of appeal denied 45
Other 34
Total 2,468
Source: automated docketing system of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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overwhelming, an intervention rate of one in seven is certainly high
enough to suggest that an uninformed waiver of the right to appeal would
expose a litigant to a definite risk.
III. Comparison of Juvenile and Adult Appeals
To identify the unique features of juvenile appeals, this section
examines the various points of difference and similarity between the
appeals of juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent and the appeals of
the closest available comparison group, namely, adults who were
convicted of crimes. The analysis considers statutory jurisdiction,
constitutional rights at the trial stage, and types of issues raised on
appeal. It also provides a frame of reference for interpreting the
statistical data.
Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act" defines a delinquent as a child
between ten and 21 years of age whom the court has found to have
committed a delinquent act before reaching the age of 18 years and is in
need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. The term "delinquent
act" means an act that would be designated a crime if committed by an
adult. Status and summary offenses, such as truancy or minor traffic
violations, are excluded from the delinquency category. Thus, the same
range of conduct underlies juvenile and adult adjudications, 2 even
though the legal consequences of adjudication may differ. A felony
adjudication does not disqualify a juvenile from later holding public
office, serving on a jury or voting-typical disqualifications for felony
convictions.' 3 This is not to say that a delinquency adjudication won't
later present problems for the juvenile, however. Pennsylvania law
provides for the meting out of harsher sentences to adult defendants with
significant juvenile records. 4
11. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 (1981). The Juvenile
Act's section on definitions is located at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (1981).
12. The exception is the crime of murder, where jurisdiction originally lies in the criminal
court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302(2)(i) (1981).
13. "An order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a
conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction
or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6354(a) (1981).
14. See In the Matter of Brandon Smith, 573 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (juvenile record may substantially affect one's later treatment in criminal justice
system); Commonwealth v. Felix, 539 A.2d 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (lengthy juvenile record must
be considered in sentencing adult); Commonwealth v. Billett, 535 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(in sentencing adult, court could consider defendant's prior adjudication of delinquency).
Pennsylvania's Sentencing Guidelines direct a sentencing court to count in the prior record score,
inter alia, all prior juvenile adjudications of delinquency where there was an express finding that the
adjudication was based on the commission of a felony or certain weapons misdemeanors where the
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Because the legislative response to delinquency is intended to be
rehabilitative and nonpunitive,15 a juvenile court disposition is formally
considered civil, comparable to an involuntary mental health commitment
proceeding. However, the federal constitutional safeguards afforded to
children at the adjudicatory hearing are in core respects the same as the
protections afforded to adults accused of crimes. 6 That is to say, the
Gault-Winship-Breedrevolutionestablishedprocedural regularity, shifting
the orientation of the juvenile court from maximum judicial discretion to
ascertain the child's "real needs" to proof of the violation of criminal
laws. Children acquired the right to be notified of the charges, to remain
silent,' 7 to suppress evidence obtained from an unreasonable search, to
have the effective assistance of counsel, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, to compel process of favorable witnesses, to demand proof
beyond a reasonable doubt 8 and to be free of double jeopardy. 9 By
defining procedural justice for juveniles in these terms, the Court sought
adjudication occurred on or after the defendant's 14th birthday. 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(b)(1)(ii)
(1993).
15. On the history and mission of the juvenile court, see STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND
THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE
1825-1920 (1981); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court,
23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). Cf. ANTHONY M. PLAT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1977); John R.
Sutton, The Juvenile Court and Social Welfare: Dynamics of Progressive Reform, 19.1 LAW &
SOC'Y 107 (1985). For a turn of the century perspective, see Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
16. "[Clivil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due
process safeguards in juvenile court." In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365. Of the numerous works that
discuss the post-Gault equivalence between crime and delinquency guilt-determination, cautious
assessments are found in Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Courts: An
Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 457 (1981); Irene Merker Rosenberg,
The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So
Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656 (1980).
17. Some scholars contend that it was the child's right to remain silent that finally secured the
criminalization of juvenile proceedings. "By recognizing the applicability of the privilege against
self-incrimination, juvenile adjudications could no longer be characterized as either 'non-criminal'
or 'non-adversarial,' since the fifth amendment privilege is both the guarantor of an adversarial
process and the primary mechanism for maintaining a balance between the state and the individual."
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 826, n.21 (1988).
18. The Winship Court found that "[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in
factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well as to the innocent child." 387 U.S. at 365.
19. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court held that the protections of the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited adult criminal prosecution of a youth previously
adjudicated delinquent on the same charges. When the potential consequences include both social
stigma and deprivation of liberty, the Court could "find no persuasive distinction" between an adult
criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding; both impose "heavy personal strain" upon the accused.
Id. at 531.
DUE PROCESS V. HELPING KIDS IN TROUBLE
to realize the traditional goals of criminal due process: to provide
accuracy in fact-finding and to prevent governmental oppression. It
stopped short, however, of granting juveniles a right to a jury trial,'
which remains the key difference between the federal constitutional rights
of children and adults at the trial stage.
Three other departures from full procedural parity should be noted.
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of public trial does not apply to state
juvenile proceedings.2 The question of whether minors are entitled to
a speedy trial, also guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Sixth
Amendment and applied to the states by the Fourteenth, has not been
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania appellate
courts.' Finally, the federal constitution does not acknowledge a right
to bail for adults or for children;' however, a right to bail is
recognized for adult defendants in Pennsylvania in all cases except capital
murder.24 Table 1 provides a summary of the federal and state
20. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not assure the right to jury
trial in state delinquency proceedings. Rather, the applicable standard was fundamental fairness
since the absence of a jury trial does not necessarily prevent accurate fact-finding. Furthermore, the
added protection of a trial by jury, with all its delays, formality and clamor, was considered
unwieldy such that it might discourage state innovations in dealing with the problems of the young.
The Court also remarked that it had been forced in earlier rulings to abolish most of the differences
between juvenile and criminal trials owing to serious shortcomings in state juvenile court procedures,
but that it was not ready to end the juvenile court experiment altogether: "If the formalities of the
criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little
need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the
moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it." Id. at 551.
21. "Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public shall be
excluded from hearings under this chapter." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(d) (1981).
22. Pennsylvania's criminal procedural rules, which define "prompt trial" and regulate its
computations, PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100, do not extend to juvenile delinquency cases, PA. R. CRIM.
P. 1. Interestingly, Rudovsky and Sosnov's treatise on Pennsylvania criminal procedure states that
"the only time limitation on the holding of the [adjudicatory] hearing is the constitutional right to
a speedy trial, applicable to juveniles through the Due Process Clause." DAVID RUDOVSKY &
LEONARD SOSNOV, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FORMS AND COMMENTARY, 2 WEST'S PENNSYLVANIA
PRACTICE § 18, at 392 & n.7 (Douglas Frenkel, ed., West 1991).
23. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
excessive bail does not imply an affirmative right to bail. Rather, it is for Congress to define the
classes of cases in which bail shall be permitted. This paves the way for a legislative denial of bail
in those cases where the arrestee is likely to commit crimes while on release. Bail under this theory
may properly serve two purposes: compelling appearance in court and the preventive custody of
dangerous defendants. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). For a contrary reading of
the historical record, see Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 959 (1965). Several years before Salerno, the Court in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984), authorized the use of preventive detention for accused juvenile delinquents.
24. PA. CONST. art. I, § 14. The prohibition against excessive bail is found in PA. CONST.
art. I, § 13.
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constitutional rights of juvenile and adult defendants at the trial stage.
The table shows that juvenile cases at the adjudicatory stage are not
qualitatively different from adult criminal cases. Except for trial by jury,
juveniles are guaranteed nearly the full spectrum of constitutional rights
afforded to adult defendants whose liberty may stand forfeit. Juveniles
may not lose their freedom except by competent, relevant, legally posited
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt. States may not diminish
these rights, although they may add to them. Direct appeal from the
final orders of juvenile and criminal dispositions is a prime example of
expanded rights in Pennsylvania.'
With the close similarity in rights, and with the same range of
offenses being subject to prosecution, it is reasonable to expect that many
of the same issues would be raised on appeal from adult criminal
convictions and juvenile delinquency adjudications. Recent cross-court
research' discloses that the most frequent issues raised in criminal
appeals are evidentiary, such as a challenge to a ruling on the
introduction of evidence or testimony (character testimony, hearsay,
testimony of expert witnesses) or a challenge to the sufficiency or weight
of the evidence.27 Equally applicable to juvenile prosecutions are
rulings on motions to suppress tangible evidence s (drugs or weapons)
and motions to exclude a defendant's statements (claims of a coerced
confession) or identification of the accused (improper lineup). On
25. The final order of a juvenile court is the dispositional order. Commonwealth v. Clay, 546
A.2d 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In a criminal court, it is the sentencing order. Commonwealth
v. Oates, 392 A.2d 1324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). The right to appeal also extends to certain
interlocutory orders. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 702, 5105(c) (1981); PA. R. APP. P. 311.
26. JOY A. CHAPPER AND ROGER A. HANSON, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS: FINAL REPORT (1989) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR]. To date, this is the largest and most comprehensive study
of issues raised in first-level criminal appeals. The sample included appeals brought by the defense
and decided on the merits in five sites: the California Court of Appeal, Third District, in
Sacramento; the Colorado Court of Appeals; the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, in
Springfield; the Maryland Court of Special Appeals; and the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The total
data set consisted of approximately 3,800 issues raised in 1,750 appeals. See infra note 32 for a
frequency distribution of issues raised on appeal following jury trial conviction.
See also Thomas W. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making
Norms in a California Court of Appeals, 82 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543 (1982) (a detailed case
study of the intermediate appellate court in the San Francisco Bay area). Valuable supplementary
research on criminal appeals can be found in Ronald Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences:
Penology on the Judicial Doorstep, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 122 (1977); David Neubauer,
Published Opinions versus Summary Affirmations: Criminal Appeals in Louisiana. 10 JUST. SYS.
J. 173 (1985); and John T. Wold, Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court
Decisionmaking, 62 JUDICATURE 58 (1978); John T. Wold and Greg A. Caldeira, Perceptions of
"Routine" Decision-Making in Five California Courts of Appeal, 13 POLITY 334 (1980).
27. See In the Interest of D.S., 622 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
28. See In the Interest of J.H., 622 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
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constitutional considerations alone, one would anticipate that juvenile
proceedings now feature the same contests over evidence as adult
proceedings since only proof admissible in a criminal trial can be used
to support a finding that the juvenile committed the offense.
A variety of less frequently raised claims of error involving
procedural or discretionary rulings (amending charging documents;
adequacy of notice in probation revocation hearings; severance or
consolidation of bills of information or defendants) may occur on appeal
from both juvenile and adult proceedings. Appeals from trial court
denials of motions to withdraw a plea (an "admit" in the vocabulary of
the juvenile court) also would seem to cut across boundaries, particularly
if raised in conjunction with a suppression or other procedural ruling.
There are some issues that would not find a counterpart in the
juvenile court system. Most prominent are challenges to jury selection
(unrepresentative panel, scope of voir dire), jury management
(sequestration, improper influences), the trial judge's instructions to the
jury and issues relating to the legality or severity of a sentence.29 In
the post-Gault era, the rationale for a separate juvenile court is to a large
extent grounded in the concept of individualized sentencing, and the
broad discretion given to juvenile court judges that it implies. Appellate
courts have been extremely reluctant to intrude upon that discretion.
Conversely, Pennsylvania's sentencing code for criminal defendants seeks
to channel trial court discretion through mandatory minimum penalties
and sentencing guidelines, and appellate review is integral to that
process.30
We also might expect criminal appeals more often to include claims
of speedy trial violations and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the
former because juvenile cases tend to move more quickly than adult
cases, and the latter because of the increased opportunities for
29. Evidence in support of a higher appeal rate in a determinate sentencing jurisdiction
(Sacramento, California) in comparison to an indeterminate sentencing jurisdiction (Rhode Island)
is presented in Roger A. Hanson and Joy A. Chapper, What Does Sentencing Reform Do To
Criminal Appeals? 72 JUDICATURE 50 (1988). This one-page report uses only a subset of the data
more thoroughly analyzed in UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 26. However, a
"startling" finding mentioned here which does not appear in the final report is that "sentencing is
the only issue in 25 percent of the criminal appeals" decided by the Court of Appeals in Sacramento.
Presumably, the figure is lower (less "startling") in Springfield -- the other jurisdiction referenced
here and, significantly, a determinate sentencing jurisdiction -- and lower still in Rhode Island. Of
course, this finding is relevant only to the degree that the determinate/indeterminate sentencing
dichotomy corresponds, mutatis mutandi, to the criminal/juvenile court dichotomy.
30. See Joseph A. Del Sole, Appellate Review in a Sentencing Guideline Jurisdiction: The
Pennsylvania Experience, 31 DUQ. L. REV 479 (1993), for a brief history of appellate review of
criminal sentencing in Pennsylvania along with the case for expanding its present scope.
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misconduct that a jury trial provides. Similarly, claims of ineffectiveness
of counsel, though widely available to both groups of defendants,31 find
firmer footing in convictions arising from a jury trial.
With potentially more issues to contest, adults might be predicted
to file more appeals than juveniles. The question remains how many
more appeals should we predict, especially when consideration is limited
to loss-of-liberty cases? From Chapper and Hanson's research, I
estimate that the unique features of adult prosecutions nearly double the
number of criminal appeals filed. 32  A reasonably conservative baseline
prediction would then put the adult appeal rate at twice that of juveniles.
At the risk of spoiling the suspense, the main empirical finding of the
present study is that adults are found to appeal eleven times more often
than juveniles. It isn't solely a matter of rates either: appeals from
juvenile delinquency dispositions are a rare event in Pennsylvania. A
31. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines the standard as follows: "It is axiomatic that in
order for Appellant to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must first demonstrate
that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; that counsel's action or inaction was not grounded
on any reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interest; and that the commission or omission so
undermined the trial that the verdict is unreliable." Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 617 A.2d 1263,
1265 (Pa. 1992).
32. Chapper and Hanson constructed a percentage frequency distribution of issues raised on
appeal (shown below) for the 1129 jury trial cases in their sample. Percentages sum to more than
100 because an appeal may raise more than one issue. Issues that would not arise (double underline)
and issues that are less likely to arise (single underline) in a juvenile appeal represent about half of
the total (46 percent). Absent more information, this suggests that the additional issues which adult
appellants might raise roughly double the number of appeals. Inevitably, this figure must remain
speculative since we could never actually count the number of appeals that juveniles would file if
they had all the issues available to them that adults have.
Percent
Issues Raised of Cases
Evidentiary ruling 43.0





Judicial intrusion or management 9.7
Jury selection or deliberation 7.9
Improper lineup/identification 6.2
Lesser included offenses/merger 3.5
Speedy trial 3.3
Statutory interpretation 1.2
Constitutionality of statute 1.0
Total 192.0
These statistics were obtained from UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 26, at 32.
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five-fold departure from the baseline prediction is a clear sign that forces
other than the formal differences between criminal and delinquency
proceedings are at play.
IV. Data
The statistical analysis that follows relies on calendar year 1990 data
from three sources. Criminal and juvenile appeal data were culled from
the automated docketing system of the superior court.33 Data on
juvenile cases resulting in commitment4 were provided by the Juvenile
Court Judges' Commission of Pennsylvania which, through the county
court probation departments, collects case-specific information on all
juvenile dispositions in each of the 67 counties. The Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing provided case-specific data on all non-DUI
criminal sentences resulting in incarceration. 3  The three sets of data
permitted the estimation of juvenile and criminal appeal rates at both the
state and county levels, and by type of offense.36
In the present analysis the juvenile appeal rate will be defined as the
total number of appeals from juvenile delinquency dispositions per 100
placements out of the home, and the criminal appeal rate will be defined
as the total number of adult criminal appeals per 100 sentences of jail or
prison. Note that in computing the appeal rates, non-confinemeni
dispositions are excluded from the denominator. Since defendants
33. Originally there was concern that the meager number of appeals docketed "juvenile"
reflected a misclassification of the type of case, but interviews with public defenders and judges from
a sample of courts confirmed the correctness of the numbers. In discussing delinquency appeals,
a recurring comment was "I knew that we didn't have any appeals, but I didn't know that other
counties didn't have them." If there is an undercount of delinquency appeals, and only those
specifying an offense type are included, the interviews suggest that it is de mininmis.
34. "Commitment" refers to any disposition which results in the removal of the child from the
home, including placement in a secure institution, residential school, drug and alcohol treatment
facility, group home, foster care, "outward bound" program, forestry camp, etc. Each of the
placement types represents an involuntary loss of liberty.
35. DUI cases are excluded due to the short and sometimes flexible terms of incarceration
(average minimum sentence was 34.2 days in 1990). 1990-1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, at 42. There were no juvenile appeals filed in the
superior court from DUI convictions in 1990. Of the 3,150 adult appeals, 222 were DU.
36. Before discussing the methodology of measuring appeal rates, a summary of the main
demographic features of the juveniles under study is in order. Most of the juveniles who were
adjudged delinquent and committed (87 percent) ranged in age from 14 to 17 years at the time of
their referral to juvenile court, with the median age at 16 years. The majority were male (93
percent) and living with one or both biological parents (80 percent). One parent households were
the most frequent living arrangement (55 percent); typically, the mother was present and the father
was absent (49 percent). Half of the juveniles committed were black, 39 percent were white, nine
percent were hispanic, and the balance were classified as "other" or "unknown." Most were still
in school (79 percent).
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seldom appeal from sentences of probation, consent decrees, or the like,
this population is less "at risk" for taking an appeal. Juvenile
commitments and recommitments following mandatory placement and
dispositional reviews37 are excluded from the denominator for the same
reason. As for the numerator, all juvenile and adult appeals filed in
1990 are included, regardless of the type of sentence or underlying
proceeding. The reason is that there are very few juvenile appeals filed,
and reducing the number further would not refine the analysis.
Table 2 sets forth the number of juvenile and criminal appeals,
commitments and incarceration sentences, and rates of appeal for each
county in Pennsylvania. The most striking feature of this table is the
absence of juvenile appeals in 54 of the 67 counties (81 percent). While
to be expected in small, one-judge counties such as Clarion, Huntingdon
and Tioga, where there were only a handful of juvenile commitments or
none at all, the lack of appeals is more counter-intuitive in mid-sized
counties such as Berks, Lycoming and York. More surprising still is the
dearth of appeals in Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery, the
large suburban counties that ring Philadelphia, each of which committed
more than 100 juveniles in 1990. Only Philadelphia had more than three
juvenile appeals, and its appeal rate, 1.3 per 100 commitments, was just
slightly higher than the state average of 1.0.
Most juvenile appeals, like adult criminal appeals, are brought
through the county public defender's office or its equivalent.38 Thus,
it bears inquiry why the same organization of lawyers that files appeals
in large numbers for its adult clients rarely does so for juveniles. For
example, in Allegheny County (Pittsburgh and its surrounding
municipalities), 488 adult appeals were filed in 1990, but only one
juvenile appeal was filed. While there is variation across counties and
from year to year (in 1991, five juvenile appeals were filed in Allegheny
County), the state totals are stable and reveal that the adult appeal rate
is at least ten times greater than the juvenile appeal rate. Recall that the
issues raised on appeal could account, by our best judgment, for just one
fifth of this disparity.
The propensity for filing more adult appeals does not seem to
depend on the type of underlying offense. As seen in Table 3, the appeal
37. "The committing court shall review each commitment every six months and shall hold a
dispositional review hearing at least every nine months." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6353 (1981).
38. Juveniles were represented by public defenders in 71 percent of placement cases, by court
appointed counsel in 15 percent, and by private counsel in 13 percent. See PENNSYLVANIA
JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS 1991, supra note 3. Here I use 1991 figures because 24 percent of
the attorney data were missing in 1990. Non-reporting on this element was 0.0 percent in 1991.
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rates are considerably greater for adults than for juveniles for each
offense type: aggravated assault (14 times greater), rape (13 times
greater), burglary (12 times greater) and robbery (17 times greater).
Complications of matching offenses across the three data sets leave only
these four offense categories for comparison,39 but they are sufficient
to show that the disparity in appeal rates is not attributable to any
difference in the types of offenses for which children and adults are
convicted. Even if fact patterns underlying the juvenile cases differ in
some systematic way from adult fact patterns - and there is no- a priori
justification for that view - such differences cannot adequately explain
the inequality in the rates of appeal. A more rigorous comparison of
juvenile and adult appeal rates would include statistical controls for the
type of underlying proceeding since more appeals follow trial convictions
than guilty pleas. 4 Unfortunately, the juvenile court data set could not
adequately distinguish between trials and pleas, and thus both are
included in the denominator of the criminal and juvenile appeal rates.
Based on interviews with juvenile court personnel across the
Commonwealth (see "Interviews" section below), an informed guess is
that about 50 percent of the juvenile placements in 1990 followed
adjudicatory hearings and 50 percent followed pleas, although this figure
varies considerably across judicial districts.4 ' By contrast, 70.8 percent
of the criminal sentences of incarceration followed pleas, 6.3 percent
followed non-jury trials, 4.6 percent followed jury trials, and data are
missing on this variable for 18.3 percent of the cases. The implication
is plain: if the fraction of juvenile cases "going adversarial" is close to
one-half, and if appeal rates are computed with only trials in the
39. The other major offense category, drgs, was too broad to allow meaningful comparison.
40. Chapperand Hanson report that "almost three-quarters of the appeals [in their sample] are
from trial convictions. The remaining quarter are from pleas of guilty, revocations of probation and
denials of post-conviction relief, and a handful of miscellaneous proceedings, such as criminal
contempt and bail hearings" (footnote omitted). UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note
26, at 31. In a study of appellate case processing, the same research team found that trials were the
underlying proceeding in 21 percent of all decided criminal appeals in the Arizona Court of Appeals
(Division One in Phoenix), 51 percent in the Florida Second District Court of Appeal (in
Lakewood), 85 percent in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and 64 percent in the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division. Of the nine appellate courts examined across the two studies,
pleas outnumbered trials only in the Arizona Court of Appeals. JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A.
HANSON, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING
CASE PROCESSING, FINAL REPORT (1990).
41. For example, juveniles rarely contest the allegations of the petition in Bucks and Allegheny
Counties, while in Philadelphia, approximately 65 percent of placements followed adjudicatory
hearings. See also PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
FAMILY COURT DIVISION, at 23, Table 1.
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denominator, then the 11-to-I ratio of adult to juvenile appeals is, if
anything, an underestimate of the true extent of the disparity.
The import of the statistical data must be kept in perspective. They
document a strikingly large difference between juvenile and adult appeal
rates, but for the most part they are silent as to the reasons this disparity
exists. One explanation might be that adult defendants place greater
store than juveniles in the notion of legal guilt (was every element of the
offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt?) as opposed to factual guilt
(did the accused commit the crime?) such that adverse rulings of the trial
court may occasion more dissatisfaction with adults. Another
explanation might be that adults face longer prison terms than minors and
are more prone to appeal on that account. Still another might be that
adolescents recognize that placement may serve a constructive purpose
in their lives, where adults see incarceration more in terms of
punishment. The available data are too sparse to rule out any of these
or a myriad of alternative explanations. Since a valid account must
square with the motives of the actors, I turned to the qualitative method
of participant interviews for help in further interpreting the statistical
data.
V. Interviews
One of the more direct ways to research the question of why
juvenile appeals are hardly ever filed is to ask the public and private
defenders handling juvenile delinquency cases to describe their
participation in the decision-making process. Accordingly, I interviewed
chief public defenders, supervisors and staff attorneys in the county
public defender offices, and several private attorneys who practice
criminal law and who occasionally represent children, approximately 30
in-depth interviews altogether. The interviews lasted, on average, about
45 minutes. In selecting persons to interview, I tried to obtain a mix of
counties by geographic location and population size, but with
concentration on the larger counties. I also interviewed a "cross-section"
of juvenile court judges, masters, probation officers, prosecutors,
administrators, and treatment staff. Follow-up interviews were held
where responses needed to be clarified.
It is important not to overstate the precision of the interview
methods.42 The sample was ad hoc and the interview questions were
open-ended. In interviewing the lawyers my aim was to get their
42. Fora series of essays on measurement errors in the interview process, see MEASUREMENT
ERRORS IN SURVEYS (Paul P. Biemer et al. eds., John Wiley & Sons, 1991).
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perceptions of how the decisions to appeal or not to appeal were made,
and in talking with the judges and court officials to understand their
perspectives on the appeal process. Consequently, hypotheses emerging
from the interviews must be considered preliminary and the conjectures
open to revision and specification. This is exploratory research, not
model-testing.
The defenders' interview responses quickly revealed an important
aspect of the values and perspectives of the juvenile court community.
While a few defenders view their roles as advocates whose sole job is to
protect the child's legal rights, many see their roles in multi-dimensional
terms. Concern with the long-term developmental needs of the child and
with legal advocacy prompts some attorneys to see appeals as an obstacle
to getting the child back on track. They fear that the taking of an appeal
merely encourages the child to hold a cynical view. Exceptions, they
say, are two-fold. If there is a serious substantive error, not merely a
technical error as to form, they will lodge an appeal, but such errors,
they say, are rare because judges seem to bend over backwards to treat
children fairly. Nearly all defenders, however, profess an adversarial
posture with respect to petitions to certify a juvenile to adult court.
Defenders observe that children don't always understand the
consequences of court actions. In commitment cases, the child has often
cycled through the court system before, perhaps several times, and some
parents don't want the child to return to the home, especially if the
placement involves a good school or drug and alcohol program. In
consequence, many defenders view the attorney's role as a combination
of advocate and guardian, with a goal of salvaging the children. In
Philadelphia, where by all accounts the adjudicatory hearings are quite
adversarial as well as fairly frequent, the same comments were heard
with respect to appeals. Since children are far less aware of their rights
than adults and far less assertive in securing them, many defenders feel
they must perform balancing acts in helping them get along with their
lives while at the same time representing their legal interests.
Clearly, the juvenile court system differs from county to county
with respect to the level of cooperation between the offices of the district
attorney, public defender and juvenile probation. In some areas, they
may work jointly to avoid legal confrontation and to fashion a viable
treatment plan for the child; in other counties, especially where the
district attorney adopts an aggressive prosecutorial stance, the level of
cooperation is less apparent.43 Juvenile court judges -often are
43. See Inger J. Sagatun and Leonard P. Edwards, The Role of the District Attorney in Juvenile
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instrumental in shaping the working relationships. While no single
organizational pattern prevails in Pennsylvania,' one procedural pattern
has emerged from the interviews. Almost all of the defenders, in
describing the decision not to take an appeal, omit any reference to the
child or the parents or guardian as participants in the process. More
typical is the total absence of any decision-making process at all. This
is especially true in busy court systems where defenders have so little
time between cases that the thought of an appeal often never even arises.
Follow-up questions reveal, with only a few exceptions, that neither the
juvenile nor the parents or guardians are advised of the right to appeal.
The defenders proffered several justifications for this practice.
Some said that the likelihood of success on appeal is slim because the
superior and supreme courts try very hard to affirm the trial judge.
Others suggest that appeals are futile because children get short sentences
and it takes months to decide an appeal.' Several defenders spoke of
the chronic underfunding of their offices such that they simply don't have
the resources to file juvenile appeals. Most even doubted whether taking
appeals is truly in the child's best interests. On this point, one defender
said that when taking an appeal, the client must be advised not to discuss
the case with anyone, including placement counselors and teachers,
during the pendency of the appeal. This means that the child may not be
able to participate in available rehabilitation programs, such as group
therapy, which are premised on the child's admission of the crime as a
critical step toward emotional and psychological health. Taking an
appeal could defeat the treatment plan.
Additionally, all of the defenders said that the trial court does not
inform the juveniles of their appellate rights,' and there is no legal
obligation to do so. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Court: Is the Juvenile Court Becoming Just Like Adult Court?, 30.2 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 17 (May
1979).
44. A classification of juvenile courts based on dominant value orientations and associated
structural traits is found in David P. Aday, Jr. and Jeanne A. Ito, An Empirical lypology of
American Metropolitan Juvenile Courts, 88 AM. J. OF Soc. 549 (1982).
45. According to officials at the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare, the average time in
placement during 1990-1991 was 9.6 months. For children in secure facilities, the average was
slightly longer, 9.8 months. Eight of the 368 children in secure facilities (as of June 30, 1992) had
been there longer than two years. The median time to dispose of an appeal, from date of docketing
in the superior court to date of filed decision, is about 9 to 10 months (8.9 months in 1990 and 9.7
months in 1991). 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, at 34; 1991
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, at 31.
46. The juvenile court judges I interviewed confirmed this point.
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Procedure, adults must be advised of their post-trial rights on the
record.47 The procedural rules do not apply to juveniles. '
The juvenile court judges who were interviewed indicated mixed
expectations as to the impact of appeals on minors. Some felt that
appeals would undermine the rehabilitation process. Three types of
harmful effects were predicted: (1) a child may not fully engage in the
treatment program if he or she holds out hope of reversal on appeal; (2)
an appeal might foster disrespect for the judicial system and the law (a
"beat the system" attitude), especially if the appeal results in a windfall
acquittal; and (3) a new adjudicatory or disposition hearing only prolongs
the legal saga deflecting the child's attention and energy from more
productive pursuits. According to the judges, each effect could increase
the rate of juvenile recidivism. On the other hand, some judges thought
that appeals might produce a positive result. "If there has been an error,
or a miscarriage of justice, an appeal should remedy that. Unfair
treatment only engenders contempt for the law."
VI. Discussion
The interviews evoke the question raised at the very beginning of
this study, that of "the attorney's role or duty in relation to the appeal of
the juvenile case. "' Defenders are subject to a variety of cross-
pressures. They are legal advocates, s° yet they take on the role of
"guardian ad litem" or substitute decision-maker when they decide not
47. "Upon the finding of guilt, the trial judge shall advise the defendant on the record .. of
the right to file post-verdict motions and of the right to the assistance of counsel in the filing of such
motions and on appeal of any issues raised therein." PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123.
48. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1.
49. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
50. This facet of their role is set out in statute: "The public defender shall be responsible for
furnishing legal counsel, in the following types of cases, to any person who, for lack of sufficient
funds, is unable to obtain legal counsel:
(1) Where a person is charged with juvenile delinquency;
(2) Critical pretrial identification procedures;
(3) Preliminary hearings;
(4) State habeas corpus proceedings;
(5) State trials, including pretrial and posttrial motions;
(6) Superior Court appeals;
(7) Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeals;
(8) Postconviction hearings, including proceedings at the trial and appellate
levels;
(9) Criminal extradition proceedings;
(10) Probation and parole proceedings and revocation thereof;
(11) In any other situations where representation is constitutionally
required.
16 P.S. § 9960.6 (emphasis added).
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to inform juvenile defendants of their appellate rights. They are part of
a "courtroom work group" which tries to guide children into a positive
future, although they recognize that a juvenile record could be used by
the adult sentencing court." They serve as liaison between the court
and the family, an important role as the family's and child's acceptance
of the treatment plan is crucial to its success, yet they must seek and be
guided by the client's wishes. Also, in comparison with their
counterparts in the prosecutor's office, they frequently struggle with
higher attorney caseloads, fewer investigative resources and weaker
political support.52
If it is understandable that juvenile commitments are not followed
by considerations of taking an appeal, regardless of whether the
commitment is to an "open" or "secure" facility, it should be kept in
mind that defender practices, like juvenile court practices generally, have
evolved in response to conflicting pressures. In this regard, several
defenders remarked that until the interview they never had occasion to
think about counseling minors on appellate rights. A few others
mentioned the seriousness of the issue and that they planned to discuss
it with their colleagues. One supervisor telephoned back to say that after
internal office review it was decided that staff defenders will begin giving
minors appellate "advisories."53  A judge of a medium-sized court
reported a similar change of practice.
Apparently, part of the reluctance to advise juveniles of their
appellate rights stems from the immaturity of the youngsters. Many
attorneys feel that adolescents, particularly delinquent adolescents, have
not reached the age of discretion and therefore lack the capacity to
intelligently discern their own best interests. But the routine extention
of these sentiments to the parents or guardian of the child is
51. Seesupra note 14.
52. The resource problems of indigent defense attorneys are so well known to lawyers (along
with the perennial efforts to improve the situation) that they have become part of the folklore of the
courts. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT, 1986; DAVID T. WASSERMAN, A SWORD
FOR THE CONVICTED: REPRESENTING INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL (1990); Suzanne E.
Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 473 (1982); Stephen G. Gilles, Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The
Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380 (1983); Note, (Un)Luckey
v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J.
481 (1991).
53. A six-month follow-up indicated that the new policy was still in place. If there was
concern initially that such a policy might prompt a flurry of appeals, it proved to be unfounded; no
juvenile appeals were filed in this suburban court during the six months. Extrapolating the
experience to other courts is problematic as the follow-up period was brief and the configuration of
this court unusual (e.g., masters preside over nearly all placement cases).
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inappropriate. If the child lacks the capacity to meaningfully participate
in his own defense, and the parents are either unavailable or their
interests conflict with those of the child, counsel should formally raise
this concern with the court. Then, the court may appoint a qualified
guardian ad litem to represent the child's interest to the attorney. 4 For
the attorney to pre-empt the decision to appeal without any judicial
proceeding on the issue of competency, and almost never to inquire as
to the wishes of the parents or guardian, would appear to run contrary
to the standards of professional conduct for lawyers.5
How best to reclaim those who have fallen into delinquency without
slighting their legal rights is an important and difficult policy issue which
should not be resolved through a casual balance of contending forces.
Like other policy issues of statewide legal import, the discussion should
be explicit and informed, with information and viewpoints collected from
all segments of the affected community. The cautionary words apply
with perhaps equal force to claims that appeals hinder or help the
rehabilitation process. Whether there is a causal connection between
appeals and juvenile recidivism is an empirical question for which there
are currently no data. However, from interviews with treatment
personnel, one may conjecture that research into this area may produce
findings that vary with the circumstances of the child. For example, an
appeals/recidivism link may be present or more pronounced in
chemically dependent children who deny having a problem. Getting
these children to buy into recovery is essential and a pending appeal
might cut down on the motivation to come to terms with the addiction.
By contrast, an appeal may have little or no effect on children whose
main problem is the absence of "life skills" such as literacy, vocational
and social skills. The appeals/recidivism relationship is unexplored
territory, but the implications are serious and the research community
should be encouraged to take up the question.
To summarize the argument to this point, according to the defenders
and judges interviewed, most juveniles and their parents are not advised
of the right to appeal, in part because of concerns that appeals will
undermine the court's efforts to (1) rehabilitate the child and (2) break
the cycle of recidivism. In keeping with the interview data, the statistics
reveal a marked disparity between adult and juvenile appeal rates, a
54. See JOHN A. PALMIERI, § 9.4. l(a)(1) PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND DEPRIVATION 94-95 (Supp. 1992).
55. "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b).
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disparity far beyond what would be expected given the differences in the
types of issues which adults and juveniles might raise on appeal. But the
statistics, while astonishing for the virtual absence of juvenile appeals,
are collateral to the main argument. In Pennsylvania there exists among
juvenile court practitioners a generally shared set of values, a juvenile
court subculture, which, in the tradition of parens patriae, effectively
nullifies the autonomy of juveniles and their parents to decide whether
or not to challenge the legality of their adjudication or commitment. By
the same process, the state juvenile court system bypasses appellate
review and the accountability that review brings to judicial tribunals
which function, in deference to the welfare of the affected party, without
public access or citizen juries. All of this is not to deprecate the goals
of rehabilitation. On the contrary, it attempts to direct attention to the
children who choose to take an appeal, and who are not at liberty during
its pendency, to make sure that they profit as much as possible from the
available programs of treatment while awaiting the decision of the
superior court.
VII. Conclusions
During the past three decades the juvenile courts of America have
undergone a series of doctrinal crises, and advocates vehemently disagree
over whether the new precepts are better than the old. For the
"traditionalists," the due process revolution of the 1960s and '70s left the
juvenile courts hamstrung, unable to freely assist children who
desperately need the help of a benevolent judge and supportive social
agencies. For the civil libertarians, the abuses of discretion carried on
under the guise of "the best interests of the child" were intolerable to the
point where the U.S. Supreme Court was required to step in to protect
the basic constitutional rights of children. More recently, the critique of
contemporary conservatives, taking aim at the "dangerous juvenile
offender, ,56 has led to the grafting of societal protection concerns onto
the rehabilitative ideal. The momentary truce attempts to accommodate
the three perspectives, with due process concerns controlling the
adjudicative stage and rehabilitative and public safety interests
dominating the intake and dispositional stages.
The present study calls a portion of this compromise into doubt by
questioning how the right to appeal is implemented in practice and
finding that the protection of the juvenile defendant's appellate rights has
56. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 for the operational definition of "dangerous juvenile
offender" in Pennsylvania.
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lost its rightful place at the dispositional hearing. Indeed, it probably
was never recognized. The right to appeal should not be overlooked or
considered expendable because of the potential (but undocumented) harm
that appeals may have on treatment efficacy and recidivism. Appellate
review provides a necessary counterweight to the informality and
confidentiality of the juvenile court. It would now be unthinkable, on
accountability grounds alone, to eliminate from adult criminal
proceedings in Pennsylvania the right to bail, the right to a jury trial,
structured sentencing, and public access to hearings, trial and records.
Yet none of these are present in the juvenile forum. The doctrine of
parens patriae and the curtain of protective confidentiality were not
intended to close off the only means of obtaining review. For the
defendant and for the juvenile court system as a whole, an informed
decision regarding the right of appeal is fundamental to the operation of
justice.
On this point, the judges of the Pennsylvania Superior Court seem
to be in general, but not complete accord. For example, In the Interest
of A.P., 7 a recent case decided en banc, the question before the
superior court was: "What means, if any, are available to a juvenile to
perfect his constitutional right to appellate review of a disposition order
when his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a direct appeal, and
relief is unavailable [to juveniles] under the Post Conviction Relief
Act?"'5  The court concluded that "counsel's failure to properly
effectuate appellant's constitutional right of appeal, unless expressly
waived by the appellant, is ineffective per se." 9 A counter-argument
that rehabilitation takes precedence over appeal was stated in a dissenting
opinion: "Is it really in A.P.'s best interest, as a sixteen-year old youth,
to now have his adjudication of delinquency reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings? "I This is a recurring policy dispute
among the judges of the superior court.6 ' For the discussion to make
progress, global statements of policy preference must yield to the
analysis of practical issues.
57. 617 A.2d 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Of the seven votes cast, three dissented and one
concurred in the result.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Id. at 767. The footnote to this sentence reads: "There is no indication in the present
record that A.P. did not desire to appeal the disposition order."
60. Id. at 776.
61. See, e.g., In the Interest of J.H., 622 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); In the Matter of
Brandon Smith, 573 A.2d 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); In the Interest of Davis, 546 A.2d 1149 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
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This paper seeks to frame the issues of how best to realize the due
process and rehabilitative goals at the post-adjudication stage. It seeks
to ground the discussion empirically, focusing attention on the factors
that appear to result in a constitutional right of appeal in name only. To
implement the right to an effective appeal, the first item on the agenda
should be a statewide procedural rule requiring trial judges to advise
juvenile defendants of their appellate rights, as presently exists for adult
defendants. The obligation of the judiciary here is unmistakable.62
Trial counsel have obligations as well. As with adult clients, defense
attorneys must take a positive role in counseling juveniles on the full
extent of their rights.63 Appeals that are legally hopeless should be
discouraged, but without overreaching and with the full recognition that
the decision rests with the client. 6'
When an appeal is taken, the decision of the superior court should
come quickly, long before the child is returned from placement.
However, most of the appeal processing time is consumed in the pre-
argument stage: in the lodging of the transcript and in the preparation
of briefs and the trial court opinion.' Once the appeal is perfected, a
similar concentration of effort is required to expedite juvenile appeals
62. "It should be the duty of the juvenile court judge to inform the parties immediately after
judgment and disposition orally and in writing of the right to appeal, the time limits and manner in
which that appeal must be taken, and the right to court-appointed counsel and copies of any
transcript and records in the case of indigency." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION--
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEALS
AND COLLATERAL REVIEW, Standard 4.2, at 37 (1980).
63. "On principle, apart from the legal argument, the least to be done, even absent a rule is
to notify the child of his right to appeal and that he can do so free of charge, if poor." Theodore
McMillian and Dorothy Lear McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile
Court-Advocate or Social Worker? 14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 600 (1970).
Whether or not trial counsel expects to conduct the appeal, he or she should promptly
inform the client, and where the client is a minor and the parents' interests are not
adverse, the client's parents of the right to appeal and take all steps necessary to protect
that right until appellate counsel is substituted or the client decides not to exercise this
privilege.
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, Standard 10.3(b), at 197
(1980).
64. "Counsel on appeal, after reviewing the record below and undertaking any other
appropriate investigation, should candidly inform the client as to whether there are meritorious
grounds for appeal and the probable results of any such appeal, and should further explain the
potential advantages and disadvantages associated with appeal. However, appellate counsel should
not seek to withdraw from a case solely because his or her own analysis indicates that the appeal
lacks merit." Id. at 197-98, Standard 10.3(c).
65. In 1991, the superior court established the "Overdue Records Program" in an "effort to
minimize the delay in preparation and transmission of the original record from the trial court to the
Superior Court." 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, at 24.
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through the argument and decision stages in the face of huge and
growing caseloads.'
The practical problems do not end here. Juvenile justice
professionals must develop or modify treatment programs to take into
account the defendants' legal interests during the pendency of an appeal
so that the children get the maximum possible benefit. In this regard,
thought should be given to legislation to protect the communications of
juveniles in rehabilitative settings with respect to past violations of
criminal law. Treatment specialists and defense lawyers should play a
prominent role in drafting such legislation.
Few of the problems mentioned here admit of easy solutions. If the
analysis is correct, it will take a great deal of effort to find and establish
a new and principled equilibrium. The challenge lies in keeping faith
with the commitment long recognized by the courts of Pennsylvania:
Our children come first.
66. A total of 6,291 appeals were filed in the superior court in 1990. That number grew to
7,121 in 1992. With about 70 percent of all dispositions decided on the merits (the balance are
discontinued, abandoned, or "washed out" by other means), and with a complement of fifteen judges
and five senior judges, the caseload now averages approximately 250 majority decisions per judicial
chamber per year. By any measure, this is a staggering volume of work.
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TABLE 1: U.S. and Pennsylvania
Constitutional Rights of Juvenile and Adult Defendants
Constitutional Delinquency Adult
Rights Adjudications Prosecutions
Federal Pennsylvania Federal Pennsylvania
Protection Against
Unreasonable X X X X
Search & Seizure
Notice of the
Charges X X X X
Right to Bail X
Protection Against
Excessive Bail X X
Assistance of
Counsel (if
commitment is a X X X X
possible outcome)
Right to Remain
Silent X X X X
Speedy Trial ? ? X X
Public Trial X X
Jury Trial X X
Confront & Cross-
Examine Witnesses X X X X
Compulsory
Process (favorable X X X X
witnesses)
Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt X X X X
Double Jeopardy X X X X
Direct Appeal X X
Legend: X = present; blank = absent; ? = undecided
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TABLE 2: 1990 Pennsylvania Juvenile and Adult Commitments,
Appeals, and Appeal Rates by County
A B (B/A) x 100 C D (D/C) x 100
1990 Juvenile 1990 Juvenile 1990 Adult 1990 Adult Adult
Commitments Juvenile Appeal Jail/Prison Appeals to Appeal
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TABLE 2 (continued)
A B (B/A) x 100 C D (D/C) x 100
1990 Juvenile 1990 Juvenile 1990 Adult 1990 Adult Adult
Commitments Juvenile Appeal Jail/Prison Appeals to Appeal










































































































** Adjusted for two appeals arising from one defendant and one lower court docket number or sequence of
numbers.
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TABLE 3:
Appeal Rates by Offense Type: Comparison of Juveniles & Adults
1990 Juvenile Delinquency 1990 Adult
Cases Criminal Cases
Offense Appeals Juvenile Jail & Appeals Adult
Type Appeal to Appeal Prison to Appeal
Commitments Superior Rate Sentences Superior Rate
Court Court
Aggrav.
Assault 222 3 1.4 1,270 247 19.4
Rape 45 2 4.4 277 156 56.3
Burglary 389 2 0.5 3,180 189 5.9
Robbery 247 2 0.8 1,875 252 13.4

